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Lakatos on Dogmatic Falsificationism 
Dogmatic (naturalist) falsificationism accepts the falsifiability of all scientific theories 
without qualification but preserves an infallible empirical basis. He is strictly empiric without 
being inductivist: he denies the fact that certainty of the empirical basis can be conveyed to 
theories. Thus, dogmatic falsificationism is the weakest mark of justification. 
The distinctive sign of dogmatic falsificationism is the recognition that all theories are 
equally conjectural. Science cannot prove any theory, but it can reject it. Scientific honesty thus 
consists of specifying an experiment in such a way that, if the outcome contradicts the theory, we 
must reject the theory. Once a sentence is rejected, it must be unconditionally rejected. Falsified 
sentences are marked "metaphysical" and denied scientifically. 
According to the logic of dogmatic falsificationism, science grows by repeatedly removing 
theories with the help of heavy facts. Thus, science is carried out by daring speculations, which 
are never proven or even probable, but some of them are then eliminated by heavy and conclusive 
rejections, and then replaced by even more daring, new and, at least initially, unfalsified 
speculations. 
The dogmatic falsificationism is, however, considered by Lakatos to be impossible. It is 
based on two false assumptions and on a too narrow criterion of demarcation between science and 
non-science. The first hypothesis is that there is a natural, psychological boundary between 
theoretical or speculative propositions, on the one hand, and the factual or observational (or basic) 
propositions, on the other hand (the "naturalistic approach" of the scientific method). The second 
hypothesis is that if a sentence satisfies the psychological criterion of being factual or observational 
(or basic) then it is true; it can be said that it has been proven from facts (the doctrine of 
observational or experimental evidence). These hypotheses are complemented by a delimitation 
criterion: only those theories are "scientific" which forbid certain observable states of things and 
are therefore factually possible to be rejected (if they have an empirical basis). 
For classical empiricists, the right mind is a tabula rasa, emptied of all original content, 
freed from any prejudice of theory. But it seems from Kant and Popper's work - and from the work 
of psychologists influenced by them - that such empirical psychotherapy can never succeed. 
Therefore, there is no natural (i.e. psychological) delimitation between theoretical and 
observational propositions. 
But even if such a natural delimitation existed, logics would still destroy the second 
assumption of dogmatic falsificationism. For the truth of the "observational" propositions cannot 
be decided unquestionably: no factual proposition can ever be proven by an experiment. 
Propositions can only be derived from other propositions, they cannot be deduced from facts: no 
statements of experience can be demonstrated. 
Finally, even if there was a natural delimitation between statements of observation and 
theory, and even if the truthfulness of the statements of observation could be undeniably 
established, dogmatic falsificationism would still be useless to remove the most important class of 
what is commonly regarded as scientific theories. Even though experiments might show 
experimental reports, their refusal power would still be limited: the most admired scientific 
theories simply do not manage to forbid any observable state of things. 
Classical justificationists admitted only proven theories; the neoclassical justificationists 
admitted the probable ones; the dogmatic falsificationists have realized that in any case no theory 
is admissible. They have decided to admit theories only if they are falsifiable - by a limited number 
of observations. But even if there were such falsifiable theories - those that could be contradicted 
by a limited number of observable facts - they are still logically too close to the empirical basis. 
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